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TWO CHEERS FOR WARREN BURGER
As Chief Justice, Warren Burger was widely respected by state
judges and federal trial judges for his administrative skills. His judicial opinions received a significantly less enthusiastic response.
Among law professors, he has few admirers, many detractors, and a
high reputation for mediocrity. In a witty commentary on his departure from the bench, The New Republic compared him to Ted
Baxter, the pompous anchorman on the old Mary Tyler Moore
show.
And yet, even Ted Baxter had his good days. So, too, with
Warren Burger. Liberals who now despise him may someday recall
him more fondly. Unlike his successor, William Rehnquist, Burger
was not an inflexible ideologue. An interesting article could be
written with the title "Warren Burger's liberal opinions."
One of Burger's most memorable opinions was written in an
environmental case, TV-4. v. Hill. 1 The case involved the construction of a dam that would imperil the snail darter, an endangered (if
not particularly attractive) species of perch. Although the dam was
almost complete at the time, Burger's opinion for the Court held
that finishing it would violate the Endangered Species Act. The
government argued that even if TVA was violating the law, the trial
judge should have balanced the threat to the snail darter against the
huge investment already made in the dam. Chief Justice Burger
rejected this invitation to balance away a clear statutory violation.
Instead, he said, the rule of law required that the judge issue an
injunction against this illegal act. Justice Rehnquist, by the way,
argued that the trial judge should have allowed TVA to violate the
statute.
Fullilove v. Klutznick2 was another major case in which Burger
split from Rehnquist and joined the liberals. The case involved a
set-aside for minority contractors. Burger upheld this fairly mild
form of affirmative action as a proper exercise of Congress's power
to promote racial equality. In another case, Burger upheld the ambitious remedial education program contained in a Detroit desegregation decree. 3 Earlier, Burger had authored the Court's opinion in
I.
2.
3.
effort to

437 U.S. 153 (1978).
448 u.s. 448 (1980).
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). Justice Powell wrote separately, in an
limit the possible impact of the Court's holding. See id. at 292.
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Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,4 which upheld the power of federal judges to order widespread busing. In
Reed v. Reed,s he wrote the first Supreme Court opinion ever to
strike down a statute discriminating against women. And in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co. ,6 Burger laid the foundations of modern employment discrimination law.
Burger was perhaps most predictably conservative in the area
of criminal procedure. Even there, however, exceptions can be
found. In the Chadwick case, 1 for example, he wrote an opinion
excluding evidence even though the police had probable cause for a
search. The evidence was suppressed because, although the police
had lawfully seized a footlocker, they had failed to get a warrant
before opening it.B Once more, Rehnquist was in the dissent.
The Burger Court is often chastised for its inconsistent opinions, fragmented votes, and poor craftsmanship. The Chief Justice
may well have been partially responsible for these problems. Yet,
even here something can be said in mitigation. For example, early
in Burger's tenure, he wrote the Harris opinion,9 which sharply limited the Miranda rule. Under Miranda, a confession cannot be used
in court unless the defendant was given the proper warnings. Harris carved a hole in this rule: the confession can be used if the defendant takes the stand and gives testimony inconsistent with the
earlier confession. The Harris opinion was attacked by leading
scholars for its inconsistency with Miranda and its glaring deficiency in judicial craftsmanship. Professors Alan Dershowitz and
John Hart Ely said the opinion "in crucial respects, flatly misstates
both the record in the case before it and the state of the law at the
time the decision was rendered." In their view, each of the Court's
arguments "masks a total absence of analysis and provides no support for its result." Burger's opinion, they said, exhibited "at best,
gross negligence concerning the state of the record and the controlling precendents." 10
The critics were undoubtedly right about Burger's failure to
4. 402 U.S. I (1971).
5. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
6. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs holds that Title VII prohibits the use of employment
criteria having a disproportionate impact on minorities, even though the employer had no
intent to discriminate.
7. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I (1977).
8. In addition to Chadwick, see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 487 (1981) (Bur·
ger, J ., concurring), for another notable example of Burger voting to overturn a criminal
conviction on constitutional grounds.
9. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
10. Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor
and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1199 (1971 ).
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reconcile Harris with Miranda. But, if The Brethren is to be believed, Burger's initial decision would have been more principled:
he wanted simply to jettison Miranda. He was persuaded not to do
so by Justice Harlan, who was concerned about the effect of an
overruling on the Court's institutional credibility.JI Would
Burger's liberal scholarly critics really have been happier if he had
stuck to his original, more principled position?
None of this means that Burger was a great Chief Justice or a
closet liberal. He was a relatively untalented, quite conservative jurist, with little flair for leadership. No John Marshall, to say the
least. Still, we can do worse than mediocre. Under more talented
leadership, the Court may yet produce the kind of cohesive majorities, principled opinions, and high technical craftsmanship that
were missing from the Burger Court. A more ideologically consistent bench will find these virtues easier to achieve. But after a few
years of the Rehnquist Court, perhaps some people will look back
nostalgically on the good old days when the Burger Court muddled
around, somewhere a bit to the right of center.
D.A.F.
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